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Jokes & Humour 
Proem 
This entry introduces the sociological significance of jokes and humour for qualitative 
research. Specifically it explores two distinctive aspects of humour. First, humour as 
methodology. Second, the place of jokes in modernity is treated as an object of sociological 
inquiry in its own right. Finally, the entry brings these two themes together to explore how the 
ways and means of ‘getting the joke’ provides researchers with a tool of knowing the social 
and appreciation of how humour manifests a distinct type of human sociability. However, 
because humour is ‘unserious’, a ‘humorous methodology’ is often treated as marginal from 
the sociological mainstream. Throughout this entry we explore how the place and significance 
of jokes in modern life lies in what their ‘un- seriousness’ tells us about the society in which 
we live. 
Humour as method 
 Getting a joke constitutes a form of knowing. As such, sociologists of various research 
backgrounds have called for the use of humour in social science research (e.g. Cormack et. al., 
2017; Watson, 2015). They identify the manner with which humour becomes a facet of the 
‘sociological imagination’. The uses of humour in social science research registers the 
relationship between ‘self and society’ by locating the tensions with which individuals find 
themselves in their roles and actions.  
Sociological inquiry is often involved in a form of ‘debunking’ (Berger, 1963) which 
explores the discrepancies between official accounts and unofficial realities. To present social 
realities as comical is to approach the serious business of ‘debunking’ through a trivialising 
mechanism. To view social life humorously becomes a way to know (or ‘get’) the conditions 
of seriousness in which social life must be lived. When Peter Berger (1963:73) writes of how 
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pacifist groups punish deviant members with a special method of ostracism, his ironic tone 
brings to light the discrepancies of pacifist ideals and practice: “while permitted to continue to 
work and live in the community, not a single person will speak to him ever. It is hard to imagine 
a more cruel punishment. But such are the wonders of pacifism.” Or when Goffman (1961:341) 
highlights the similarities between psychiatrists and prostitutes, this incongruous juxtaposition 
is employed for two purposes. First to tell you something about how certain social roles require 
‘dramatic realisation’, the emphasising of certain actions and the calling attention to them as 
constitutive of their role. And second to burst the bubble of legitimation which goes along with 
power relations: the claims to precedence which psychiatrists command, but which prostitutes 
were denied, is incongruous given both ‘do’ the same thing – performing ‘expertise’ for the 
sake of the client (Cormack et. al., 2017:390-391). 
 The methodological tool of humour for social scientists is a ‘perspective by 
incongruity’ (Watson, 2015). Pacifists become sadists; psychiatrists become prostitutes. 
Incongruity is a methodological tool for its interpretive potential and analytical scope: to view 
a pacifist as a sadist serves the purpose of demonstrating not so much hypocrisies within 
pacifist practice but rather the logic of pacifist practice itself. If a pacifist is defined by their 
non-violence, their conduct is set in motion in a certain way which precludes and occludes 
certain options which others groups and identities have at their disposal. Between the pacifist 
world-view and the practical realities they encounter, their ostracism practices become socially 
meaningful and a worthy object of sociological knowledge. The practical methodological take 
home is: locating the ‘joke’ in the social structure becomes the way to identify the tensions and 
contradictions which social groups seek to resolve or work within. 
Modernity & Jokes 
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 Humour is a methodological tool. But humour is also a way to appreciate an ontology 
of the social. When it comes to humour in modern societies, studying jokes and joking cultures 
reveals the distinctive ontology of modern sociability. Peter Berger’s Redeeming Laughter 
(2014) formalizes the relation between modernity and a distinctive ‘modern sense of humour’:  
Modernity pluralizes the world. It throws together people with 
different values and worldviews; it undermines taken-for-granted 
traditions; […] This brings about a multiplicity of incongruences 
– and it is the perception of incongruence that is at the core of 
comic experience. Sociologists have used the phrase ‘role 
distance’ to describe the detached, reflective attitude of modern 
individuals toward their actions in society. […] The same 
distance may well be the basis of a specifically modern sense of 
humour. (Berger, 2014:188, original emphasis) 
In modernity, having a ‘sense of humour’ helps you navigate a world in which no one is, 
properly speaking, ‘at home’. Modernity is not for a particular group of people but a world 
where we are all, to varying degrees, ‘unalike together’. In modernity, humour manifests itself 
at an intra-personal level: having a ‘good sense of humour’ is an individual obligation and 
accomplishment on par with other moral and cognitive qualities in persons, so much so that its 
absence is treated as either a source of moral contempt or psychological pathology. 
 Navigating modernity through jokes and joking reveals how this intra-personal 
obligation - to develop a ‘sense of humour’ - meets social inter-actions and relations. Kuipers’ 
Good Humour, Bad Taste (2015) consists of a survey of Dutch humour and, in part, constitutes 
an ethnography of the Netherlands through jokes told. For Kuipers, joking is not a simple 
matter of identifying what people find funny in a particular cultural context. More important is 
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how the practice of telling jokes relies upon a remarkably dexterous intelligence in how to be 
with and among others. Kuipers demonstrates that joke telling in Dutch society requires not 
necessarily knowing what particular content resonates with Dutch persons as opposed to 
French persons. It is the styling of jokes that is demonstrably more important. The sense of 
sociability which surrounds joking partners requires an ability not to know what is and is not 
permissible but instead to use jokes to register the boundary between where funniness meets 
transgression. Joking and humour is ‘in the telling’. Notice how in this logic the joke is doing 
the social work of registering how an individual finds common connection with others where 
the line between good taste and bad taste is not an explicit boundary. Joking demonstrates an 
aspect of the ordering of social relations in modernity: joking is a collaborative effort to find 
the boundaries within ourselves and amongst others in a society where social connections are 
more fragmented and pluralised. 
 Joking becomes a way to register not our connections to other people, but the nature of 
the connection and perceptions we have of other people. In this regard jokes are political. 
Indeed, Weaver (2011) has claimed that joking is the thorn within modernity’s political project 
of order-building. Modernity institutes a world with a clear demarcation of boundaries. 
However, such order-building has a side effect: ambivalence. The problem of ambivalence is 
the unease and threat to order which is evoked once two opposing ideas, principles or values 
overlap. For Weaver, the mobilisation of humour amongst certain groups and peoples registers 
the impossibilities of ordering building. The uses of humour amongst marginalised groups is a 
case in point. In the history of black performance in American society we see a form of 
resistance humour and reverse racist discourse being deployed through white-stereotypes of 
black persons. Minstrelsy - the performance of blackness as seen from the perspective of the 
white person - was used by early Vaudeville performers, such as Bert Williams and Ernest 
Hogan, to register ambivalences and exploit them through the incongruities of humour. As such 
SAGE Encyclopaedia of Social Science Research Methods  
Daniel R. Smith, Cardiff University.   
minstrelsy and stereotyping became, strangely, a way to gain legitimacy in the racist, order-
building discourse of segregated America and a means to subvert such racisms by exploiting 
the semantic ambiguity which humour rests on. 
Techniques of togetherness in modern societies: secrets and jokes 
Let’s put these two methodologies together. Jokes are both a means to know the social 
and reveal the distinctive form(s) of sociability modernity puts in place. When Georg Simmel 
wrote ‘The sociology of secrecy and of secret societies’ (1906) he had something similar mind. 
Degrees of secrecy are at work in all forms of social relationships, but the ‘secret’ in modernity 
registers the way a plurality worlds collide, repel and oscillate among one another. Jokes, I 
suggest, do similar work because jokes and secrecy manifest human ‘togetherness’ in similar 
ways. “Secrecy”, writes Simmel (1906:462), “secures, so to speak, the possibility of a second 
world alongside the obvious world, and the latter is most strenuously affected by the former.” 
For even if the existence of a secret is not known, or even suspected between persons, the 
concealment of a secret comes to determine and modify the relationship between the parties 
involved. Jokes share this structural form: a shared joke suggests the possibility of a ‘second 
world’ which owes its existence to the shared and mutual dependency of one person to another. 
Jokes secure this ‘second world’ in way that comes to influence and inform the ‘first world’ 
between persons and groups. A shared joke modifies and characterises the sociability of those 
involved.  
Two examples help illustrate this colonisation of our primary reality by the ‘second 
world’ of the joke. The first illustrates the everyday sociability of togetherness of jokes and 
their relation to modern social conditions. The second illustrates jokes’ ability to register and 
underline the darker underside of modernity.  
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If modernity is the bringing together of a plurality of lifeworld’s, jokes significance in 
the life of subcultural groups is to be expected. Schiermer’s (2014) ethnographic portrait of 
hipster culture from Scandinavia and beyond is one case in point. Hipsters are known for their 
use of irony both as a means of social exchange (hipsters say ironic things to each other) and 
as a mode of cultural expression (hipster dress and style, for instance, is often ironic). Irony is 
at once a means of social cohesion within hipster culture and a symbol of the ‘Hipster’, as a 
distinct cultural figure, which orientates their relation to modern social conditions.  
As to the former, Schiermer notes that irony has been unduly neglected by sociologists 
for its social qualities. Irony is often viewed as a way to keep a distance from others and the 
world. But this fails to see the sociability irony, as an aesthetic form, relies on:  
Irony is first and foremost a way of being together; a powerful 
but hazardous tool used in concrete interaction. The successful 
understanding of an ironic remark creates instant social bonds, 
whereas mistaken irony creates embarrassing and awkward 
situations. (Schiermer, 2014:171) 
The aesthetic form of irony - to know what and how to be ironic - mirrors and comes to secure 
the social form of the ironist: to ‘get irony’ is a signal of social membership. But where the 
irony becomes more than a distinct way of being together is that the features and qualities of 
irony itself reflect and realises aspects of hipster identity which other joke forms could not 
achieve. 
The question becomes, what are hipsters ironic about? And, what does irony’s 
intentionality tell us about the distinctive nature of hipster identity? Hipster irony circulates 
around what Schiermer (2014:171) calls ‘failed objects’. Hipster dress has an element of self-
consciousness about it which not only marks ‘the hipster’ out from others. Hipster dress is 
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‘different’ in a way that is ‘ironic’ because what they wear comes to be read by others as 
intelligible and meaningful only if, on some level, there is a shared assumption that what is 
being worn is being worn ‘for a joke’ (‘ironically’). Examples include: men dressed as ‘old 
seaman (‘skippers’); ‘a beard …in their wife-beaters and with their tattoos’, or a ‘paedophile 
moustache’ (examples in Schiermer, 2014:172f). These forms of dress become ironic because 
they are ‘failed objects’: they were once meaningful objects in the past but have since become 
‘matter out of place’ in a way which provides a commentary upon aspects of ‘successful 
objects’ in the present. Now ‘ironic’ forms of attire were once intensely popular but have since 
been resigned to the doldrums of kitsch and bad taste. But they are kitsch and bad taste because 
they’re meta-fashion. Ironic dress is addressed to the modernity of fashion. Fashion is never in 
fashion. As such “irony is not a necessity forced upon the hipster…but is nourished and sparked 
by the inauthenticity of the object.” (Schiermer, 2014:173) 
 As a methodology, exploring the ‘second world’ of the joke informs our insights about 
the primary social world of modernity as a distinctive way of ‘being together’: the ‘joke’ of 
ironic fashion tells us something about the primary world of fashion we’re all involved in. With 
this in mind, our second example demonstrates how the ‘second world’ of the joke tells us 
something quite distinctive about the nature of modernity as the bringing together of difference, 
and our (in)abilities to live with each other. 
 Holocaust survivor Primo Levi writes of his initial experience of Auschwitz as that of 
undergoing a joke: 
They make us enter an enormous empty room that is poorly 
heated. We have a terrible thirst. The weak gurgle of the water in 
the radiators makes us ferocious; we have had nothing to drink 
for four days. But there is also a tap – and above it a card which 
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says that it is forbidden to drink as the water is dirty. Nonsense. 
It seems obvious that the card is a joke, ‘they’ know that we are 
dying of thirst and they put us in a room, and there is a tap… I 
drink and I incite my companions to do likewise, but I have to 
spit it out, the water is tepid and sweetish, with the smell of a 
swamp. (Levi, quoted in Phillips, 2002:32, emphasis added) 
As with Weaver (2010), Levi’s evocation ‘this must a joke!’ becomes the thorn in modernity’s 
‘politicization of life’: if you exterminate an entire group for their mere existence, then 
exterminator and exterminated must have no common ground in any respect. But, as Phillips 
(2002:32) says of Levi’s passage: “He is in search of an explanation for something unbearable, 
and the idea he comes up with is that the card itself must be a joke…” The joke becomes a way 
to understand how a situation which denies a common humanity may, in some way, still refer 
to such a common humanity. The form of the joke is able to afford such a line of reasoning. 
Levi’s reasoning is: The Nazi’s know we’re dying of thirst and no one would deny those dying 
of thirst from water. But because the Nazi’s deny us anything in common with them means 
they have put the sign up as a joke to make us, imprisoned Jews, think the water is bad. 
Therefore: it must be fine to drink. That the sign is in fact true means the Nazi’s were protecting 
us, but that we did drink the water still makes the joke on us. In a situation of radically denied 
common humanity, “that there are jokes and jokers in the world makes this experience, at least 
initially, intelligible to him.” (Phillips, 2002:33)  
Intelligibility arises from that ‘second world’ between jokes and jokers which, whether 
there is or is not a joke, comes to determine the primary world of persons. The modes of 
knowing the joke – to know there is one, how to ‘get it’ and who it is ‘on’ - bares on an insight 
Simmel has about secrecy and knowledge in relation to human sociability: all forms of 
association rely upon, to some degree, knowledge of others but what is distinctive about 
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humans is that “[n]o other knowable object modifies its conduct from consideration of its being 
understood or misunderstood.” (Simmel, 1906:445) Levi’s ‘This must be joke’ works upon a 
similar logic. The joke is a way of retracing the lines of knowledge involved in our relationship 
to others. Attempts to ‘get the joke’ relies upon reconstructing where ways of knowing and 
understanding meet attempts to deny knowing and understanding each other. 
Coda 
 Jokes and humour are an important tool to do qualitative social research. Equally jokes 
themselves tell us distinctive aspects about the social life we examine. As qualitative 
researchers, often our tools of knowing – methods – become themselves means of grasping a 
distinctive way of being. Jokes are an epistemological tool to know what counts as ‘being 
together’ in social situations as much as they are insights into a distinct ontology of human 
togetherness. 
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